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ENVIRONMENTAL  AND  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
LINKAGES  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY: 
THE  NITRATE  PROBLEM  AND  CAP  REFORM 
SUMMARY 
Two  aspects  of  the  trade/environmental  interface  are  examined  in 
this  paper.  First,  the  effect  of  domestic  pol icy  reform  ("Mac 
Sharry Plan")  on  the European  community's  level  of fertilizer use 
and on the level of manure  from  livestock production are analyzed. 
A goal is to determine the compatibility of trade and/or production 
policy  reform  with  the  pursuit  of  environmental  objectives.  A 
second  aspect  is  an  examination  of  the  effect  of  environmental 
policy  measures  on  agricultural  production  and  trade.  Examined 
policies include provisions of the EC  Nitrate Directive (especially 
regarding livestock density restrictions)  and a  hypothetical tax on 
nitrogen fertilizer use.  The effect of these environmental policies 
are traced through to world markets  and  to U.S.  agriculture. 
CAP  reform  implies  significant  reductions  in  the  delivery  of 
nitrates  to  the  soil.  In  particular,  nitrogen  fertilizer  use  is 
reduced because of large crop output price reductions and the land 
setaside  program.  Nitrogen  deliveries  from  livestock  manure  are 
less  affected.  Total  nitrate deliveries  are  reduced  to  about  the 
same  magnitude  implied  by  the  adaption  of  an  ad  valorem  tax  on 
nitrogen fertilizer use  in the range of  50  percent.  If the Nitrate 
Directive is imposed on top of CAP  reform,  total nitrate deliveries 
are  reduced  by  about  the  same  amount  as  a  75  percent  ad  valorem 
tax. 
A  tax  on  nitrogen  fertilizer  use  has  generally  small  effects  on 
agricultural  production  and  trade.  EC  exports  of  "other  coarse 
grains"  (primarily barley)  are the most affected -- perhaps reduced 
as  much  as  30  percent.  As  a  consequence,  the united states could 
experience  perhaps  a  2  to  5  percent  rise  in  its  coarse  grain 
exports.  The  Nitrate Directive primarily affects  EC  production of 
pigs,  sheep,  and poultry. Although the Directive has practically no 
effect  on  crop  supply,  demand  for  feedgrains  is  significantly 
diminished.  Gains to the united states implied by decreased EC  net 
exports of grains predicted under terms  of  CAP  reform are reduced 
by  about  2.7  mmt  if the Nitrate Directive is implemented. \ 
ENVIRONMENTAL  AND  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
LINKAGES  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY: 
THE  NITRATE  PROBLEM  AND  CAP  REFORM 
until recently there has not been strong interest in the 
relationship between environmental  and agricultural pOlicies  in 
the  European  community  (EC).  Environmental policies have  been 
typically in the domain  of national  and provincial governments, 
reflecting the local,  particularized character of environmental 
problems  in the past.  Agricultural policies,  on the other hand, 
have  emphasized  common  Ec-wide  concerns  of  food  security,  rural 
development,  preservation of rural character,  and  responsiveness 
to the demands  of rural-based interest groups,  especially 
farmers. 
There is now  an  increasing recognition of agriculture's 
contribution to environmental degradation  (Agra  Europe,  1991; 
Vocke,  1991).  One  of the chief concerns is the effect of nitrate 
accumulation  on water quality.  Nitrates  from  livestock manure  and 
chemical fertilizers are  leached  from the soil and  lead to the 
contamination of potable water supplies in several highly 
populated areas of the  EC  and to the eutrophication of  EC  inland 
and  coastal waters.  The  problem is considered sufficiently 
serious  and trans-national in character that it must  be dealt 
with  on  an  EC-wide basis. 
In this paper,  two  aspects of the trade/environmental  interface 
will be  examined.  First,  the effect of domestic policy reform on 
the EC's  level of fertilizer use  and  on the level of manure  from 
livestock production will be  examined.  Specific policy 
implications of the  "Mac  Sharry Plan"  for  EC  agriculture and the 
environment will be  examined.  A  goal is to examine the 
compatibility of trade and/or production policy reform with the 
pursuit of  environmental objectives.  A  second aspect is an 
examination of the effect of environmental policy measures  on 
agricultural production and trade.  Examined policies include 
provisions of the  EC  Nitrate Directive  (especially regarding 
livestock density restrictions)  and  a  hypothetical tax on 
nitrogen fertilizer use.  The effect of these environmental 
policies can be traced through to world markets  and to U.S. 
agriculture. 
Nitrate Pollution in the  EC 
Nitrate pollution has  been  identified as  a  major problem in the 
EC.  Many  policymakers are now  concerned about the effect of 
animal  manures  and fertilizer use  on water quality.  In many  areas 
of the  EC,  public water supplies cannot meet the  EC  standard for 
potable water of  50  milligrams  (mg)  of nitrate per litre.  Vocke 
(1991)  has  identified areas where the problem is particularly 
1 severe:  The Netherlands,  low  lying parts of  Belgium and  France 
(especially Brittany),  southern Britain,  Denmark,  much  of  Germany 
(especially Lower  Saxony  and  former  East Germany),  and northern 
Italy.  Vocke  argues that the major threat to water supplies for 
human  consumption  stems  from the widespread  introduction of 
intensive livestock production under confined conditions in the 
1960's and the rapid growth subsequently.  Health risks are 
associated with methemoglobinemia  or "blue baby"  syndrome.  This 
dangerous  condition is caused  by  oxygen starvation in bottle-fed 
infants.  There  are also fears that high concentrations of 
nitrates contribute to the incidence of stomach cancer,  although 
the connection is unproven. 
Nitrate pollution has also contributed to the eutrophication of 
EC  inland and coastal waters.  Nitrates from  animal  manures  and 
nitrogen fertilizer applied to crops are responsible for this 
problem.  The  leached nitrates promote the growth of algae,  whose 
decay depletes  oxygen  levels,  especially in marine waters. 
(Phosphates are considered more  of  a  problem than nitrates for 
fresh water eutrophication.) 
EC  agricultural policies have contributed to the nitrate problem. 
The  EC's  Common  Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  has  encouraged the 
growth of  livestock and  crop production through guaranteed high 
domestic prices,  exceeding world  levels and divorced  from  world 
price trends and disturbances.  High returns  from agricultural 
activities have  been capitalized into land prices that have  in 
turn favored  intensive,  land-saving livestock and  cropping 
technologies.  These technologies have  been largely responsible 
for excess deliveries of nitrates to the environment. 
Although  environmental problems  extend throughout the whole  of 
the  EC,  environmental  damage  from nitrate pollution is more  of  a 
localized problem,  concentrated especially in the areas listed 
above.  Leaching risks are considered the most  serious during 
periods of high rainfall,  low evaporation,  and  low crop nitrogen 
demands:  that is,  usually during the fall.  optimal policy 
measures would  ideally be targeted to those areas where the 
problems are the most serious and would take  account of 
seasonality influences.  Also complicating remedial policy 
measures is the dynamic  nature of nitrate pollution:  it can take 
up to 40  years  for nitrates to travel from the soil to 
groundwater.  Travel time is largely a  function of  intervening 
rock  layers  (Hanley,  1990). 
Potential Policy Responses 
Potential policy options  can be  categorized into three areas: 
reduction in nitrogen fertilizer applications,  reduction in 
animal manure  applications,  and better management  of nitrate 
applications  (Hanley,  1990).  One  way to reduce fertilizer 
applications is through taxing their use.  Hanley reports, 
2 however,  that most estimates of fertilizer demand  show it to be 
inelastic,  implying that high tax rates would  be  needed to 
achieve sizeable reductions.  Also,  the localized nature of the 
nitrate problem would  imply differentiated tax rates,  although 
transactions costs could be high.  A  uniform tax would  be simpler 
administratively,  although potentially unfair.  A  headage tax on 
livestock producers could be used to internalize costs of manure 
disposal.  other solutions could be  based on tradeable nitrogen 
quotas,  or  lump-sum  compensation of producers subject to the 
nitrogen/headage taxes. 
Increased regulation of  land use is another possibility. 
Regulations covering land in vulnerable  zones  could be used to 
control detrimental management  schemes  and to encourage the 
adapt  ion of other schemes.  Regulations  could be enacted to limit 
nitrogen applications in the fall and/or encourage the planting 
of fall cover crops.  Regulations  could limit the application of 
manure  during periods of heavy rainfall and  low crop growth. 
Policies could encourage the construction of manure  storage 
facilities,  the transport of manure to other areas,  and/or the 
reduction of concentrations of livestock.  Laws  could restrict the 
large-scale ploughing of pasture land. 
Although not primarily directed at environmental problems,  CAP 
reform  (the  "MacSharry Plan")  could promote  lower net deliveries 
of nitrates to the environment.  An  aim of the program is to move 
away  from  supporting markets  and toward supporting landholders 
(Agra  Europe,  1991).  Reduction of producer prices of cereals of 
30  percent would translate into  lower  land prices,  thereby 
encouraging more  extensive agricultural techniques that use less 
yield-enhancing fertilizer.  Although cattle prices would  be 
reduced  by  only  15  percent,  decreased profitability could lead to 
fewer  head  and  consequently less manure,  all else constant. 1  The 
land set-aside provisions  (the idling of  15  percent of arable 
land  on  holdings  above  20  hectares)  could be useful  in switching 
from  arable crop production to grasslands or woodlands  in 
vulnerable areas.  Although Hanley  (1990)  reports that most 
environmental research does  not predict significant nitrate 
abatement  from policies oriented toward outputs,  the effect on 
nitrate deliveries of the Mac  Sharry Plan deserves attention 
because of the magnitude of the proposed changes. 
The Nitrate Directive 
The  EC  Nitrate Directive was  passed by the Council  of 
Environmental Ministers  on  14  June  1991.  Its intent is to limit 
nitrate levels in potable water to less than  50  mg  per litre. It 
is not part of the Mac  Sharry Plan and  many  of its details have 
lLower  grain  prices  imply  lower  feed  costs,  possibly 
offsetting the effect of  lower cattle prices. 
3 yet to be worked out  (Leuck,  1993). 
The  Directive requires  EC  member  countries to designate 
"vulnerable"  zones where water standards are not being met.  The 
countries are to develop  "codes of good practice" that are 
mandatory  in vulnerable  zones  and voluntary,  elsewhere. 
Implementation of the Directive is to take place over an eight 
year time  frame.  One  known  limitation is that the application of 
livestock manure  can be  no  more than  170  kg per hectare at the 
end of the eight year period.  A  further restriction,  although not 
clearly spelled out,  is that the application of manure  must  be 
consistent with good agricultural practice in relation to use of 
nitrogen by  crop,  the amount  of nitrogen from  chemical 
fertilizers and other sources,  and the amount  already in the 
soil.  The  application rate may,  therefore,  be  less than the 
prescribed maximum. 
SWOPSIM  Modeling structure 
The  model  chosen for this analysis is the  SWOPSIM  model  developed 
at the  Economic  Research Service  (ERS)  to analyze the 
implications of worldwide agricultural trade liberalization 
(Roningen  and Dixit,  1989).  This section describes the modeling 
framework  and discusses  how it was modified to analyze the  EC 
nitrate problem. 
The  SWOPSIM  model  is characterized by  an  economic specification 
that includes constant elasticity supply and  demand  equations  and 
summary policy measures.  For each region  i  and  each commodity  j, 
demand  and  supply functions  are modeled as  follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
where  CPij  and  PPij  are domestic incentive prices facing 
consumers  and producers,  respectively,  of  commodity  j  in country 
i.  CPim  and  PPim  are consumer  and producer prices of commodities 
closely related to commodity  j  in either consumption or 
production,  respectively.  CPim  in the demand  function 
accounts  for sUbstitution possibilities in consumption.  CPim  in 
the supply function accounts  for the use of commodity  m  as  an 
intermediate input in the production of  commodity  j.  PPim  in the 
supply function represents sUbstitution possibilities for the 
producer.  Xi1  in the demand  function accounts for the derived 
demand  for the product as an  intermediate input for the 
production of  Xil•  Xil is typically a  livestock product which 
enters into demand  functions  for feed.  Trade is the difference 
4 between domestic  supply  and  demand: 
(3) 
Domestic  incentive prices depend  on the level of consumer  and 
producer  support  (modeled  in terms of consumer  and producer price 
wedges  CSWij  and  PSWij),  and  on world prices denominated  in local 
currency: 
CP ij  =  CSWij  + F (E  i *  WP j)  (4) 
(5) 
where  Ei  is the exchange rate of  i  with respect to the u.s. 
dollar,  and  WPj  is the world reference price of  j  measured  in 
u.s.  dollars.  Function relationships F(  )  and  G(  )  allow a 
specification of world to domestic prices to be  less than or 
equal to 1.  If equal to 1,  then  100  percent of  a  world price 
change is transmitted domestically.  A  value less than  1  indicates 
that the government  intervenes to cushion domestic producers 
and/or consumers  from  experiencing the full change.  These 
coefficients are referred to as price transmission elasticities. 
World markets clear when net trade of  a  commodity across all 
regions  sums  to zero: 
n  n  n 
L  Tij=L Xij-L  Dij=O  (6) 
i-l  i-l  i-l 
The  model  covers  22  agricultural commodities  and  includes  11 
countries/regions.  Livestock commodities  include beef  and veal, 
pork,  mutton and  lamb,  poultry meat,  poultry eggs,  milk,  butter, 
cheese,  and milk powder.  The  crops  include wheat,  corn,  other 
coarse grains  (barley,  rye,  oats,  sorghum,  millet,  mixed grains), 
rice,  soybeans,  other oilseeds,  cotton,  sugar,  and tobacco. 
Processed commodities  include soybean meal  and oil,  and other 
oilseeds meal  and oil.  The  countries modeled are the United 
states,  Canada,  the European  Community,  other Western  Europe, 
Japan,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  developing exporters  (Brazil, 
Argentina,  Indonesia,  Thailand,  Malaysia,  Philippines),  newly 
industrialized Asia  (South Korea,  Taiwan,  other East Asia), 
former  centrally planned economies  (Eastern Europe,  former  Soviet 
Union,  China),  developing importers,  and the rest of the world. 
5 Incorporation of  EC  Nitrogen Fertilizer Sector:  Demand 
The  SWOPSIM  model  does  not explicitly include  a  fertilizer 
sector.  Researchers at the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource  Economics  (ABARE)  used  a  SWOPSIM-based  model to examine 
the effect of  a  nitrogen fertilizer tax in the EC  (Gunasekera et 
al.,  1992).  They  calculated an  output tax equivalent of the 
fertilizer tax.  They  used estimates of nitrogen fertilizer use 
provided by the  SPEL  modeling group in Germany  (1989)  in 
calculating their output taxes.  Their comparative static 
experiment consisted in introducing the tax as  an  adjustment to 
the producer subsidy wedge  on  EC  agricultural commodities 
(equation 5).  Their results will be  compared to those of this 
study later. 
As  an alternative to the ABARE  specification,  this study 
explicitly incorporates an  EC  nitrogen fertilizer sector.  The 
primary advantage is that the effect of policy changes  on 
fertilizer use  and the delivery to the soil of nitrates from 
fertilizer can be tracked.  The  structure is similar to the way 
feedgrain  demand  is modeled in SWOPSIM.  The quantity supplied of 
crops using fertilizer enter into the fertilizer demand  equation 
and are exponentially weighted by their proportion of total 
nitrogen fertilizer use.  The  share coefficients are calculated 
from the  SPEL data referred to above  and are  shown  in Table 1. 
An  Ec-wide  own-price elasticity of demand  for fertilizer is based 
on  a  study by Burrell  (1989).  Burrell reports that most estimates 
of fertilizer demand  in individual  EC  countries  show  an inelastic 
price response.  For the united Kingdom,  Burrell's estimate ranges 
between -0.4 and -0.6.  For this study,  an elasticity value equal 
to the average  (-0.5)  is used in the fertilizer demand  equation. 
As  in SWOPSIM's  feedgrain specification,  the share data,  along 
with other model  parameters,  can be used to calculate a 
fertilizer cross price elasticity for each of the crops that use 
fertilizer.  This relationship is based on the symmetry 
restriction on production functions  implied by neoclassical 
microeconomic production theory.2 The explicit SWOPSIM  equation 
used to calculate the elasticity is as follows: 
2See,  for  example,  chapter  8  of  Intriligator  (1971) 
specifically equation 8.3.22. 
6 Table 1 -- Calculation of Fertilizer Price Elasticities For Crop Supply 
Input Data 
Input  Consumer Price  Consumption by ST86 
(ecu/mt)  Crops 
(1000 mt) 
Nitrogen Fertilizer  567.20  5249 
Output Data and Elasticities 
Commodity  Fertilizer  Producer  Production  Own-price  Fertilizer 
Share  Price  Supply  Price 
(ecu/mt)  (1000 mt)  Elasticity  Elasticity 
Wheat  .385  188  72138  .52  -.04 
Corn  .084  186  25482  .61  -.03 
Other  .335  163  57742  .57  -.06 
Coarse 
Grain 
Rice  .006  341  1971  .40  -.01 
Soybeans  .013  431  1084  .40  -.03 
Other  .091  468  7655  .71  -.05 
Oilseeds 
Sugarbeets  .070  370  13423  .17  -.01 
Source: Input data and Fertilizer Share: SPEL Group (1989); Producer Price, Production, 
and Own-Price Supply Elasticities: Sullivan, Wainio, and Roningen (1989); Fertilizer 
Price Elasticity: Calculated. 
7 Fertilizer cross-price elastici ty = fertilizer share  (7) 
* total fertilizer, expendi ture *own-price supply elastici ty 
cropproduct~on value 
Table  1  shows the necessary data to calculate the cross-price 
elasticity.  The  cross-price elasticity itself is shown  in the 
last column of the second block of data. 
Incorporation of  EC  Nitrogen Fertilizer Sector:  Supply 
Except for the work of McCorriston and  Sheldon  (1989),  there has 
been little work  on the modeling of fertilizer supply.  Their 
approach stressed an  imperfectly competitive market structure for 
the fertilizer sector.  The  ABARE  study,  on the other hand, 
implicitly assumed perfectly elastic supply.  This specification 
is consistent with  a  competitive industry in an open  economy 
where it has little or no  effect on world prices of fertilizers. 
This study provides  two  alternatives for modeling supply.  Both 
assume  a  competitive market structure.  In the first,  the small 
open  economy  specification is used,  assuming  an infinite supply 
elasticity.  Although the modeling of the EC  fertilizer industry 
is not  a  goal,  this research seeks to provide an alternative to 
the simple open  economy  specification.  A  simple alternative is to 
specify a  closed economy  framework that allows the  EC  fertilizer 
industry to be affected by the tax.  It is assumed,  therefore, 
that the output of the fertilizer industry is described by  an 
upward  sloping supply curve.  The  supply elasticity is assumed to 
equal unity. 
Description of Scenarios 
Two  sets of policy changes are examined.  The first set 
encompasses  EC  CAP  reform referred to as the  "Mac  Sharry Plan." 
The  second set of policy changes are meant to achieve 
environmental objectives.  There are two specific scenarios.  The 
first is the adaption of the  EC  Nitrate Directive.  The modeling 
emphasizes the effects of the Directive on  livestock densities. 
The  second deals with the imposition of  a  hypothetical tax on the 
use of nitrogen fertilizers.  This scenario corresponds closely to 
the scenarios examined  by ABARE. 
Mac  Sharry Plan 
There have  been several versions of the Mac  Sharry Plan.  The 
version used in this analysis is the one planned for 
implementation over three years starting in 1993/94.  The  specific 
features modeled are as  follows: 
8 o  Price supports are reduced: 
- grains intervention prices cut 30  percent 
- oilseed support prices cut 50  percent 
- beef  intervention price cut  15  percent 
commodities not covered include cotton,  rice,  and  sugar 
o  Compensation for price reductions made  through direct 
payments: 
- 45  ecu/mt for grains 
- 152  ecu/mt for oilseeds 
o  Payment  based on historic yields/herd size and require 
current production 
o  Larger  farmers  required to set aside  15  percent of arable 
crop base 
Unlike the U.S.  program,  the  EC  setaside is not commodity 
specific and  small  farmers  are exempt.  Estimates of how  much  land 
will be setaside and  how specific crop acreage will be affected 
must  be  exogenously  incorporated into the model.  For this study, 
estimates made  by the European Branch of the Agriculture and 
Trade Analysis Division  (ATAD)  of  ERS  were used.  These  estimates 
of  individual commodity  land area reductions are as  follows --
wheat:  -7  percent;  corn:  -9 percent;  other coarse grains:  -12 
percent;  soybeans  and other oilseeds:  -12  percent. 
The  Mac  Sharry Plan scenario is modeled as  a  unilateral  EC  policy 
change,  that is,  no  other country is assumed to change its 
agricultural policies either in conjunction with the  EC  or as  a 
result of the  EC  change.  One  important modeling detail is that 
the price transmission elasticities from the  SWOPSIM  model  are 
kept fixed at pre-liberalized levels.  (Actually this is true for 
all scenarios.)  These elasticities are documented  by  Sullivan 
(1990)  and are shown  in Table 2.3 As  can be seen,  the  EC 
elasticities tend to be  small,  thereby indicating the great 
degree to which the  EC  insulates itself from world price 
disturbances.  Another  implication is that EC  policy changes 
affecting trade will have magnified effects on world prices 
because the EC  and other like protectionist countries will not 
absorb the world price shocks caused  by the EC  policy change. 
An  unresolved question in the Mac  Sharry Plan is what effect the 
direct payments meant to compensate producers for support price 
reductions will have  on production.  In terms  of U.S.  policy 
discussions,  the issue is the degree to which the direct payments 
are  "decoupled"  from production decisions.  The  two  extremes are 
3Price transmission elasticities for regions not shown  in the 
table are equal to 0.5  for all commodities. 
9 Table  2  -- Price Transmission Elasticities 
Commodity  European  United  Canada  Other  Japan  Australia  New 
Community  States  Western  Zealand 
Europe 
Beef  .10  .65  .60  .10  .10  .90  .50 
Pork  .60  1.00  .50  .25  .50  .75  .80 
Mutton!  .10  .90  .60  .60  .40  .90  .50 
Lamb 
Poultry  .60  1.00  .30  .25  .80  .75  .80 
Wheat  .15  1.00  .85  .15  .40  .80  .70 
Corn  .25  1.00  .95  .20  .75  .90  .75 
Other  .10  1.00  .95  .25  .75  .90  .75 
Coarse 
Grains 
Rice  0  .80  .75  .65  .05  .50  -
Soybeans  .30  1.00  1.00  1.00  .70  1.00  1.00 
Other  .30  1.00  1.00  1.00  .70  1.00  1.00 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  .10  .20  .30  .10  .10  .70  .50 
- ..  N('+- Ann  pp  lCable 
Source:  Sullivan  (1990). 
10 examined  in this report:  full decoupling  and  zero decoupling.4 
EC  Nitrate Directive 
Many  of the provisions of the  EC  Nitrate Directive have yet to be 
worked out.  However,  Leuck  (1993)  has  examined the likely effects 
of the Directive on  livestock supplies in individual  EC 
countries.  His  analysis  implies the following percentage changes 
in  EC  livestock supplies:  beef:  -4.8 percent;  pork:  -11.7; 
mutton/lamb:  -.9 percent;  poultry:  -10.1 percent;  eggs:  -10.1 
percent;  and dairy:  -7.8 percent.  Because the Directive will  be 
implemented along with  EC  CAP  reform,  this scenario will be run 
assuming that the changes described above  (Mac  Sharry Plan 
scenario)  are occurring simultaneously. 
Nitrogen Fertilizer Tax 
Although it is not planned,  the  EC  could choose to  impose  a  tax 
on the use of nitrogen fertilizer as  a  way to reduce the delivery 
of nitrates to the soil.  As  mentioned previously,  ABARE 
researchers have already used  a  SWOPSIM-based  model  to examine 
the implications of  a  50  percent and  75  percent ad valorem 
nitrogen fertilizer tax.  This report uses these  same percentage 
taxes in simulation analysis.5 Results will be  compared to those 
of the other scenarios and to those of ABARE. 
The  scenarios above are identified by letter labels from  "A"  to 
"H".  Table  3  shows  the listing. 
Effect of Policy Changes  on Production,  Trade,  and Prices 
Detailed modeling results for the change in EC  production and 
trade,  world prices,  and U.S.  trade for all SWOPSIM  commodities 
are reported in appendix tables 1-4.  Tables  4-7  report changes  in 
EC  production and trade,  and world prices for the grains, 
oilseeds,  and  sugar.  Most discussion will focus  on results in 
these tables. 
4The  decoupling  issue  has  also  been  examined  by  Abler  and 
ShortIe  (1992)  in their analysis of the environmental consequences 
of the Mac  Sharry Plan.  The  decoupling assumptions they make  have 
significant implications  for the results.  As  will  be  seen  later, 
their  results  in  both  instances  imply  greater  reductions  in  EC 
agricultural production than what might  seem realistic. 
5The  previous  section  discusses  the  modeling  differences 
between the ABARE  and the present approaches. 
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production 
Income support assumed decoupled to 
production 
MacSharry Scenarios with Livestock Density Restrictions (Nitrate Directive) 
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Scenario D 
Fertilizer Tax Scenarios: 50 percent tax 
Scenario E 
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Income support assumed coupled to 
production 
Income support assumed decoupled to 
production 
Fertilizer supply elasticity set to one 
Fertilizer supply elasticity set to infinity 
Fertilizer supply elasticity set to one 
Fertilizer supply elasticity set to infinity 
The  largest grain reductions result from the Mac  Sharry scenarios 
(table 4).  The  assumption regarding the decoupling of the direct 
income  support plays an  important role in the magnitude of the 
reductions.  Aggregate crop production is reduced by  9  percent 
under the assumption of  coupled policies,  and almost  15  percent 
12 Table 4 
Changes in EC Production and Trade, and World Prices: MacSharry Proposal 
Percent Change 
Scenario A:  Income Support Assumed Coupled to Production 
Commodities  Change in  EC  Change in EC  Change in  EC  Change in 
Production  Exports  Imports  World Price 
Wheat  -7.79  -55.08  8.24 
Corn  -10.94  241.62  4.03 
Other Coarse  -10.43  -170.75  11.07 
Grains 
Rice  .07  -32.64  .86 
Soybeans  -15.58  1.16  1.31 
Other  -22.06  97.13  8.20 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  .14  .78  .38 
Scenario 8: Income Support Assumed Oecoupled from  Production 
Commodities  Change in EC  Change in  EC  Change in EC  Change in 
Production  Exports  Imports  World Price 
Wheat  -12.64  -76.79  12.08 
Corn  -17.61  295.97  6.51 
Other Coarse  -16.55  -210.91  15.37 
Grains 
Rice  .12  -32.75  1.25 
Soybeans  -28.31  1.97  1.85 
Other  -39.48  173.75  14.29 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  .81  4.33  .03 
13 Table 5 
Changes in  EC  Production and Trade, and World Prices: Nitrate Directive 
Percent Change 
Scenario C:  Income Support Assumed Coupled to Production 
Commodities  Change in  EC  Change in EC  Change in EC  Change in 
Production  Exports  Imports  World Price 
Wheat  -7.81  -44.21  7.50 
Corn  -10.85  170.28  5.52 
Other Coarse  -10.46  -124.86  10.08 
Grains 
Rice  .07  -32.69  .74 
Soybeans  -15.60  .92  .78 
Other  -22.08  96.88  7.65 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  .14  .78  .36 
Scenario 0: Income Support Assumed Decoupled from  Production 
Commodities  Change in EC  Change in  EC  Change in EC  Change in 
Production  Exports  Imports  World Price 
Wheat  -12.66  -66.03  11.33 
Corn  -17.49  225.82  8.01 
Other Coarse  -16.58  -166.07  14.37 
Grains 
Rice  .12  -32.80  1.14 
Soybeans  -28.34  1.74  1.33 
Other  -39.51  173.53  13.73 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  .81  4.33  .01 
14 Table 6 
Changes in  EC  Production and Trade, and World Prices:  Fertilizer Tax Scenarios 
Percent Change 
Scenario E (50 Percent Fertilizer Tax and Fertilizer Supply Elasticity = 1) 
Commodities  Change in  EC  Change in EC  Change in EC  Change in 
Production  Exports  Imports  World Price 
Wheat  -1.18  -5.97  .86 
Corn  -.89  10.60  .38 
Other Coarse  -1.76  -16.43  1.11 
Grains 
Rice  -.30  2.25  .11 
Soybeans  -.90  .06  .09 
Other  -1.46  6.42  .57 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  -.30  -1.58  .32 
Scenario G (75 Percent Fertilizer Tax and Fertilizer Supply Elasticity =  1) 
Commodities  Change in  EC  Change in  EC  Change in  EC  Change in 
Production  Exports  Imports  World Price 
Wheat  -1.70  -8.59  1.24 
Corn  -1.28  15.25  .54 
Other Coarse  -2.53  -23.59  1.59 
Grains 
Rice  .  -.43  3.24  .15 
Soybeans  -1.29  .09  .14 
Other  -2.10  9.22  .82 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  -.43  -2.28  .46 
15 Table 7 
Changes in EC Production and Trade, and World Prices: Fertilizer Tax Scenarios 
Percent Change 
Scenario F (50 Percent Fertilizer Tax) 
Commodities  Change in  EC  Change in EC  Change in  EC  Change in 
Production  Exports  Imports  World Price 
Wheat  -1.59  -8.06  1.17 
Corn  -1.21  14.31  .51 
Other Coarse  -2.38  -22.15  1.50 
Grains 
Rice  -.40  3.04  .14 
Soybeans  -1.21  .09  .13 
Other  -1.97  8.66  .77 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  -.40  -2.14  .43 
Scenario H (75 Percent Fertilizer Tax) 
Commodities  Change in  EC  Change in  EC  Change in  EC  Change in 
Production  Exports  Imports  World Price 
Wheat  -2.19  -11.09  1.61 
Corn  -1.66  19.70  .70 
Other Coarse  -3.27  -30.43  2.06 
Grains 
Rice  -.56  4.19  .20 
Soybeans  -1.67  .12  .17 
Other  -2.71  11.90  1.06 
Oilseeds 
Sugar  -.56  -2.95  .59 
16 under decoupling. 6  7 The  largest contribution to the supply 
reduction comes  from the EC  setaside.  Setasides alone cause an 
8.2 percent aggregate crop volume reduction. 
The primary effect of the Nitrate Directive is on  livestock 
production.  The  Directive implies the following percentage point 
reductions  from the Mac  Sharry scenarios -- beef:  3  percent, 
pork:  10  percent;  mutton/lamb:  1  percent;  poultry meat:  9 
percent;  eggs:  8  percent;  and dairy:  less than  1  percent 
(appendix table 1). 
The  imposition of taxes  on fertilizer use  imply modest reductions 
in EC  crop production  (tables  6  and  7).  A  50  percent ad valorem 
tax reduces  crop production between 1.26  and  1.70 percent, 
depending on the value of the fertilizer supply elasticity.8 
Similarly,  a  75  percent tax reduces crop production between 1.81 
and  2.33  percent. 
Figure  1  shows  a  comparison of results with those of the ABARE 
study.  Because the ABARE  study implicitly assumes  an infinite 
fertilizer supply elasticity,  results from  scenarios  F  (50 
percent tax)  and  H  (75  percent tax)  are shown.  As  is evident from 
the figure,  the ABARE  study  implies smaller crop production 
reduction than this study.  The  50  percent tax reduces aggregate 
crop production  0.85 percent  (compared to 1.70 percent),  and the 
75  percent tax reduces it 1.28 percent  (compared to 2.33 
percent) . 
As  an experiment,  the ABARE  producer subsidy wedge  changes  (from 
their Table  3)  used to model  the fertilizer tax were  inserted 
into the ERS  SWOPSIM  model.  The  50  percent tax implied  a 
reduction in aggregate crop production of  0.97  percent,  and the 
75  percent tax implied  a  1.49 percent reduction.  These results 
are much  closer to the ABARE  results than to those of this study, 
SWeights  used to calculate aggregate  crop volume  changes  are 
based on the volume proportion of each crop to the total:  wheat --
.405,  corn  -- .141,  other  coarse  grains  -- .318,  rice  -- .007, 
soybeans -- .005,  other oilseeds -- .042,  and sugar -- .082. 
7Comparable scenarios run by Abler and ShortIe  (1992)indicate 
between a  78  and  97  percent reduction in grain production assuming 
0.33  to 0.67  decoupling of policies.  These reductions  seem rather 
extreme.  It is unlikely that such reductions would be permitted in 
the  EC  as  a  consequence of  CAP  reform. 
8If  the  fertilizer  supply  elasticity  is  a  finite  positive 
number,  then  the  incidence  of  the  tax  is  shared  with  the  EC 
fertilizer  industry.  As  a  consequence,  the  price  of  nitrogen 
fertilizer  does  not rise  by  the  full  amount  of  the tax,  and  the 
negative effect on  crop production is less. 
17 Figure  1 
Comparison  with  ABARE  Results 
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CJ  SWOPSIM 75% implying that the modeling of the  EC  fertilizer industry  (that 
is,  the incorporation of fertilizer demand  and  supply 
relationships)  can have  a  significant effect on the modeling 
results. 
Trade  and World  Prices 
As  with production,  the largest trade and world price effects 
come  from the Mac  Sharry Plan scenarios  (table 4).  The  reduction 
in production due to setasides and price decreases,  and the 
expansion of consumption due to price reductions  imply  large 
trade effects.  Net wheat exports decrease between  55  to 76 
percent,  depending  on the degree of decoupling assumed.  Net  corn 
imports  increase dramatically,  between  240  to  300  percent from  a 
small base of over  2,000  thousand metric tons.  The  EC  changes 
from  a  net exporter of other coarse grains to a  net  importer:  a 
change relative to base of  -170 to -210 percent.  The world price 
of wheat  increases  8  to 12  percent;  the price of corn increases 
between  4  and  8  percent;  and the price of other coarse grains, 
between  11  and  15 percent. 
The  reduction in livestock supply  implied by the Nitrate 
Directive reduces the demand  for feedgrains  (table 5).  Net wheat 
exports in scenarios C  and  D  are about  10 percentage points less 
than in the corresponding scenarios A  and  B.  Net  corn  imports are 
about  70  percentage points less;  and the changes  in net exports 
of other coarse grains are about  45  percentage points less. 
Fertilizer taxes  imply  smaller but not insignificant reductions 
in EC  net exports.  Net wheat exports decrease between  6  and  11 
percent;  net corn  imports  increase between  10  and  20  percent;  and 
other coarse grain exports decrease between  16  and  30  percent. 
World price increases are small:  less than  2  percent in most 
cases.  These results are larger than those obtained by  ABARE.  As 
in this study,  their largest adjustment  came  in other coarse 
grains net exports:  a  10 to 16  percent reduction.  They  show  a 
much  more modest  increase in corn imports:  between  1  and  3 
percent.  Only in rice imports do they  show  a  larger increase in 
imports:  between  4  and  6  percent compared to 2  and  4  percent in 
this study. 
Effect on u.S.  Agricultural Trade 
Appendix Table  4  shows the effect of the policy changes  on u.S. 
agricultural trade.  The  Mac  Sharry Plan would  imply  increases in 
wheat exports between  1  and  4  percent,  in corn exports between  4 
and  10 percent,  and  in coarse grain exports between  18  and  36 
percent.  These  increases could be significantly reduced as  a 
consequence of the Nitrate Directive,  however.  The united states 
is primarily affected as  EC  feedgrain  demand  is reduced through 
smaller livestock inventories resulting from the Directive. 
19 Modeling results imply that wheat exports could be  0.4  mmt  (or 
1.5 percent)  less;  corn exports,  1.4 mmt  (or  3.3 percent)  less; 
and other coarse grain exports,  0.9  mmt  (or  9  percent)  less. 
The  EC  fertilizer tax scenarios  imply very little for the united 
states.  The  only significant effect might  be  on other coarse 
grain exports,  which could increase in the  2  to 5  percent range. 
Effect of Policy Changes  on the  EC  Nitrate Balance 
Policies affecting  EC  agricultural output or input use are also 
likely to significantly affect the delivery of nitrates to the 
soil.  The task is to obtain a  quantitative assessment of the 
policy changes  described in the modeling scenarios on nitrate 
deliveries.  At this time it is not possible to relate the policy 
changes to actual  improvement  in water quality or  some  other 
environmental objective.  Part of the problem,  as alluded to 
previously,  is the dynamic aspect of the accumulation of nitrates 
over time.  Another problem lies in the aggregate EC-wide modeling 
approach.  An  examination of changes  in the aggregate  EC  nitrate 
balance masks  problems  in specific regions within the  EC.  A 
better and feasible approach,  but also more  costly,  would  involve 
the construction of regionally focused  components  of the SWOPSIM 
model that would tie in to the other country/regions  in the 
model. 
This report adapts the methodology of Koopmans  (1987)  who  used 
IIASA's  Basic Linked  System to examine the delivery to the soil 
of nitrates and other nutrients.9 Koopmans'  study used 
coefficients to calculate nitrogen from various livestock manures 
and the amounts  of nitrogen retained in crops  and grassland.  He 
obtained the livestock coefficients from the Netherlands Ministry 
of Agriculture and the crop coefficients from the Dutch  food 
table and personal  interviews.  As  Koopmans  admits,  the approach 
is probably only minimally satisfactory given that coefficients 
for the Netherlands are applied to the EC  as  a  whole.  This 
weakness  implies that less significance should be attached to 
nitrate levels shown  in this report and more  significance 
attached to a  comparison  among  scenarios of changes  in nitrate 
deliveries.  Future,  more  disaggregated,  analysis would require 
greater precision in tracking nitrate deliveries. 
Table  8  shows the calculation of the base  EC  nitrogen balance 
against which the scenarios can be  compared.  The first block 
shows  nitrogen from  livestock manure.  Animal  numbers  are from the 
Food  and Agriculture organization  (FAO).  In the modeling 
9It is difficult to directly  compare  Koopmans'  results with 
those  of this study.  The  modeling  structures  are very different, 
and Koopmans  used  a  1980  base period for model  initialization. 
20 Table 8 - Base EC Nitrogen Balance 
Nitrogen From Uvestock Manure 
Livestock  No. of Head  Nitrogen  Nitrogen 
(1000)  Manure Coeff.  Delivery 
(kg/year/animal)  (1000 mt) 
Cattle  83,581  64  5,349 
Pigs  95,707  13  1,244 
Sheep  83,111  20  1,662 
Poultry  794,000  .48  381 
Total  - - 8,636 
Fertilizer Application and Nitrogen Stored in Crops 
Crop  Nitrogen  Production  Nitrogen  Nitrogen 
Fertilizer  (1000 mt)  Percentage  Stored in 
Use  Coefficient  Crop 
(1000 mt)  (1000 mt) 
Wheat  2,021  71,688  .019  1,362 
Straw  - - - 680 
Com  441  24,974  .015  375 
Other  1,758  56,288  .015  844 
Coarse Grain 
Rice  31  1,275  .013  17 
Soybeans  68  903  .006  5 
Other Oilseeds  478  7,462  .006  45 
Sugarbeets  367  14,415  - -
Other  85  - - -
Non-ST86  4,651  - - -
Crops 
Total  9,900  - - 3,328 
Nitrogen in Grassland 
Area (1000 ha)  Grass Coeff.  Nitrogen Coeff.  Nitrogen in Grass 
(mt/ha)  (1000 mt) 
56,163  6.0663  .03  10,221 
"-"  - eitner not available or not a  )licable  pp 
21 Table 9 - EC Nitrogen Balance 
1,000 Metric Tons 
Base Scenario: 
Scenarios  Fertilizer  Uvestock  Nitrogen  Nitrogen  Net 
Application  Manure  in Crops  in Grass  Delivery 
(+)  (+)  (-)  (-) 
Base  9,900  8,636  3,328  10,221  4,987 
Mac Sharry and Nitrate Directive Scenarios: 
Seen. A  9,551  8,824  3,032  10,971  4,372 
Scen.B  9,308  8,535  2,851  10,971  4,021 
Scen.C  9,551  8,506  3,032  10,971  4,054 
Seen. D  9,308  8,227  2,851  10,971  3,713 
Fertilizer Tax Scenarios: 
Seen. E  9,111  8,636  3,285  10,221  4,241 
Seen. F  8,862  8,636  3,270  10,221  4,007 
Seen. G  8,801  8,636  3,266  10,221  3,950 
Seen. H  8,524  8,636  3,248  10,221  3,691 
22 scenarios,  the percentage changes of meat production  (e.g.  beef, 
pork,  lamb)  from the base are used to calculate new  levels of 
nitrogen delivery. 
The  next block shows  nitrogen fertilizer applied to crops  and 
nitrogen stored in crops.  The  source of the fertilizer data for 
the  SWOPSIM  crops is the  SPEL  group  (1989).  FAO  reports total 
nitrogen fertilizer use for the  EC  in 1986 at 9,900  thousand 
metric tons.  The difference between this amount  and the total for 
SWOPSIM  crops is attributed to Non-SWOPSIM  crops.  Because these 
crops are not modeled,  this amount  is assumed not to change in 
any of the scenarios.  The  nitrogen percentage coefficient 
available for the SWOPSIM  crops except sugarbeets is used to 
calculate the nitrogen stored in the crops.  Although straw is not 
part of the model,  it is calculated as  a  percentage of wheat 
production.  Because coefficients are not available for the Non-
SWOPSIM  crops,  there is no  accounting for  how  much  nitrogen is 
stored in these crops.  10 
The  last block shows  the nitrogen in grass  from  EC  pasture land. 
Permanent pasture land in hectares  from  FAO  is multiplied by the 
grass coefficient to calculate the grass tonnage.  This  amount  is 
multiplied by the nitrogen storage coefficient to calculate the 
nitrogen stored in the grass. 11  Although pasture land is not 
tracked in SWOPSIM,  there will be  increases in pasture land 
resulting from the  land setaside portion of the Mac  Sharry Plan. 
These  land use changes have  been estimated by  ERS  and have been 
described in the previous section. 
Results 
The  largest reductions  in nitrogen fertilizer consumption  come 
from the fertilizer tax scenarios  (table 9).  The  50  percent tax 
reduces consumption between  8  and  10.5 percent.  The  75  percent 
10Because  there  is  no  modeling  of  reduced  fertilizer  use  by 
Non-SWOPSIM  crops,  the reductions in nitrate deliveries described 
below are understated. 
llKoopmans  used  a  grass  coefficient  equal  to  8  mt/ha  in his 
work.  He  dutifully  notes  the  weaknesses  of  applying  this 
coefficient to all of the  EC,  but justifies its use as  an average 
for the EC  excluding Greece,  Spain,  and Portugal.  In attempting to 
work back from his nitrogen in grass value of 7,562 thousand metric 
tons,  total  pasture  land  was  calculated  to  be  31,567  thousand 
hectares for his 1980  base.  FAO  reports pasture land for  1980  for 
the  EC-9  at 41,629  thousand hectares.  Because of the discrepancy, 
this  .report  adjusted  the  grass  coefficient  downward  by  the 
percentage of the difference in pasture area.  This coefficient is 
applied to the EC-12  in this report. 
23 tax reduces it between  11  and  14  percent.  Fertilizer use declines 
under the Mac  Sharry Plan between  3.5 and  6  percent.  Because the 
Nitrate Directive does  not affect crop supply  (at least as it is 
modeled),  it has  no effect on fertilizer use. 
Nitrogen deliveries from  livestock manure  are reduced most under 
the Nitrate Directive  (between  1.5 and  4.7 percent).  Better 
comparisons of the Nitrate Directive scenarios are the Mac  Sharry 
scenarios.  There,  the percentage reductions are both about 3.5 
percent.  Most  of the reduction comes  from pigs,  sheep,  and 
poultry,  about  195  thousand metric tons.  The reduction from 
cattle is only about  115  thousand metric tons. 
Assumptions regarding the decoupling are important in evaluating 
the environmental effects of  CAP  reform.  If predicted output 
levels differ as  a  result of decoupling,  then so will nitrogen 
fertilizer use.  Scenarios A and  C both show greater use of 
fertilizer  (243  thousand metric tons)  compared to scenarios Band 
D,  respectively  (table 9).  Scenario A shows  an  increase in 
nitrogen from  livestock manure rather than a  decrease.  The 
increase results from the assumption that the direct payments 
made  to grain producers are fully coupled to production.  The 
grain price reductions,  therefore,  do  not greatly reduce grain 
supply,  but they do  expand  livestock supply due to less expensive 
feed.  Beef  supply  increases 0.9 percent in scenario A while it 
decreases  by  7.1 percent in scenario B  (which  assumes 
decoupling).  The  manure  from the additional cattle accounts for 
97  percent of difference of deliveries of nitrogen from manure 
between scenarios A and  B. 
Nitrogen retained in crops is a  direct function of crop supply. 
Nitrogen in grass is a  function of the  EC  land setaside.  It is 
assumed that idled land is converted into grass pasture land.  The 
Mac  Sharry Plan setaside increases nitrogen retained in grasses 
by  about  750  thousand metric tons. 
Conclusions 
There is increasing overlap in environmental and agricultural 
policies.  In the EC,  pOlicies dealing with nitrates and water 
quality  (such as the Nitrate Directive)  will likely affect 
agricultural production and trade patterns.  Likewise,  policies 
dealing with agricultural restructuring  (like CAP  reform)  will 
affect the rate of delivery of nitrates to the environment.  This 
paper has attempted to estimate the magnitude of these effects. 
CAP  reform implies significant reductions in the delivery of 
nitrates to the soil.  In particular,  nitrogen fertilizer use is 
reduced because of large crop output price reductions and the 
land setaside program.  Nitrogen deliveries from  livestock manure 
are less affected.  Total nitrate deliveries are reduced to about 
24 the  same magnitude  implied by the adaption of  an  ad valorem tax 
on nitrogen fertilizer use in the range of  50  percent.  If the 
Nitrate Directive is. imposed  on top of  CAP  reform,  total nitrate 
deliveries are reduced by  about the same  amount  as  a  75  percent 
ad valorem tax. 
A tax on nitrogen fertilizer use has generally small effects on 
agricultural production and trade.  EC  net exports of  "other 
coarse grains"  (primarily barley)  are the most affected --
perhaps reduced as much  as  30  percent.  As  a  consequence,  the 
united states could experience perhaps  a  2  to  5  percent rise in 
its coarse grain exports.  The Nitrate Directive primarily affects 
EC  production of pigs,  sheep,  and poultry.  Although the Directive 
has practically no effect on crop supply,  demand  for feedgrains 
is significantly diminished.  Gains to the United states under  CAP 
reform are reduced by about  2.7  mmt  if the Nitrate Directive is 
implemented. 
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26 Appendix  Table  1 
Modeling Results  -- World  Price  Changes 
Percentage  Change 
WDPRICE% 
-- MacSharry-- --Nitrate Directive  ---- Fertilizer Tax  ----
ST86-WD  SCEN  A  SCEN  B  SCEN  C  SCEN  D  SCEN  E  SCEN  F  SCEN  G  SCEN  H 
BF  2.50  7.26  5.02  9.71  .06  .08  .08  .10 
PK  -3.30  -3.44  1. 58  1. 50  .08  .11  .12  .15 
ML  -1.11  - .17  .42  1. 34  .04  .06  .06  .08 
PM  .28  3.36  3.88  6.80  .10  .14  .14  .19 
PE  -1.08  2.80  3.93  7.60  .07  .09  .10  .13 
DM  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00 
DB  3.84  5.73  5.94  7.86  -.06  - .08  - .09  - .11 
DC  -.37  -.53  3.17  3.06  .01  .01  .01  .02 
DP  -2.05  1.72  1.41  5.31  .03  .04  .04  .06 
WH  8.24  12.08  7.50  11.33  .86  1.17  1. 24  1. 61 
CN  4.03  6.51  5.52  8.01  .38  .51  .54  .70 
CG  11.07  15.37  10.08  14.37  1.11  1. 50  1. 59  2.06 
RI  .86  1. 25  .74  1.14  .11  .14  .15  .20 
SB  1. 31  1. 85  .78  1. 33  .09  .13  .14  .17 
SM  1.49  .69  -2.01  -2.67  .07  .09  .10  .13 
SO  1.04  3.11  3.85  5.87  .10  .13  .14  .18 
OS  8.20  14.29  7.65  13.73  .57  .77  .82  1.06 
OM  4.10  4.54  -1.50  -.95  .25  .34  .36  .47 
00  4.26  7.94  5.35  9.03  .31  .41  .44  .57 
CT  .93  1.42  .81  1. 31  .08  .11  .12  .15 
SU  .38  .03  .36  .01  .32  .43  .46  .59 
TB  .05  .07  .04  .06  .00  .01  .01  .01 
27 Appendix  Table  2 
Modeling  Results  -- EC  Supply  Changes 
Percentage  Change 
SUPPLY%  EC 
MacSharry-- --Nitrate Directive  ---- Fertilizer Tax 
ST86-WD  SCEN  A  SCEN  B  SCEN  C  SCEN  D  SCEN  E  SCEN  F  SCEN  G  SCEN  H 
BF  .92  -7.14  -2.31  -10.11  - .00  - .00  - .00  - .00 
PK  7.20  8.86  -3.33  -1. 82  .01  .02  .02  .02 
ML  2.50  2.32  .81  .64  - .00  - .00  - .00  -.01 
PM  6.01  -.99  -3.64  -9.98  .01  .02  .02  .03 
PE  4.43  -1.53  -4.13  -9.54  .01  .02  .02  .03 
DM  .14  -;04  - .43  -.62  .00  .00  .00  .00 
DB  .16  -1.12  - .49  -1. 77  .00  .00  .00  -.00 
DC  .24  .76  -.75  -.25  .00  .00  .00  .00 
DP  .31  -1.84  -.92  -3.06  .00  -.00  -.00  - .00 
WH  -7.79  -12.64  -7.81  -12.66  -1.18  -1. 59  -1.70  -2.19 
CN  -10.94  -17.61  -10.85  -17 .49  -.89  -1. 21  -1.28  -1. 66 
CG  -10.43  -16.55  -10.46  -16.58  -1. 76  -2.38  -2.53  -3.27 
RI  .07  .12  .07  .12  -.30  - .40  - .43  -.56 
SB  -15.58  -28.31  -15.60  -28.34  -.90  -1. 21  -1. 29  -1. 67 
SM  .15  .09  -.16  -.20  .01  .01  .01  .01 
SO  .15  .09  -.16  -.20  .01  .01  .01  .01 
as  -22.06  -39.48  -22.08  -39.51  -1.46  -1. 97  -2.10  -2.71 
OM  .02  .01  -.03  - .04  .00  .00  .00  .00 
00  .02  .01  -.03  - .04  .00  .00  .00  .00 
CT  .07  .10  .06  .09  .01  .01  .01  .01 
SU  .14  .81  .14  .81  -.30  - .40  - .43  - .56 
TB  .01  .01  .00  .01  .00  .00  .00  .00 
28 Appendix  Table  3 
Modeling Results  -- EC  Net Agricultural Trade  Changes 
Percentage  Change 
NTRADE%  EC 
MacSharry-- --Nitrate Directive  Fertilizer Tax  ----
ST86-WD  SCEN  A  SCEN  B  SCEN  C  SCEN  D  SCEN  E  SCEN  F  SCEN  G  SCEN  H 
BF  -48.55  -137.25  -86.63  -172 .48  - .05  -.07  - .08  -.10 
PK  581. 33  684.00  -59.84  34.52  1.72  2.33  2.48  3.20 
ML  -15.98  -14.88  -7.61  -6.54  .03  .04  .04  .06 
PM  36.19  -79.68  -127.75  -232.54  .55  .74  .79  1.02 
PE  170.24  -139.16  -276.51  -558.13  1.00  1. 35  1.44  1. 86 
DM  .02  .00  - .00  -.00  -.00  .00  -.00  .00 
DB  -16.25  -30.29  -23.29  -37.33  -.01  -.01  - .01  - .02 
DC  4.50  14.08  -13.39  -4.11  - .00  -.01  - .01  -.01 
DP  3.34  -15.76  -7.61  -26.60  - .01  -.01  - .01  -.01 
WH  -55.08  -76.79  -44.21  -66.03  -5.97  -8.06  -8.59  -11. 09 
CN  241. 62  295.97  170.28  225.82  10.60  14.31  15.25  19.70 
CG  -170.75  -210.91  -124.86  -166.07  -16.43  -22.15  -23.59  -30.43 
RI  -32.64  -32.75  -32.69  -32.80  2.25  3.04  3.24  4.19 
SB  1.16  1. 97  .92  1. 74  .06  .09  .09  .12 
SM  5.82  .87  -8.78  -13 .40  .03  .04  .05  .06 
SO  -.01  -.21  -.34  - .53  -.01  -.01  -.01  - .01 
as  97.13  173.75  96.88  173.53  6.42  8.66  9.22  11.90 
OM  1.82  -2.90  -9.00  -13.46  - .09  -.12  - .13  -.16 
00  -2.97  -5.26  -3.35  -5.64  -.21  -.29  - .31  -.39 
CT  -.32  - .48  -.28  - .45  - .03  - .04  - .04  - .05 
SU  .78  4.33  .78  4.33  -1. 58  -2.14  -2.28  -2.95 
TB  - .03  - .05  - .03  - .04  -.00  -.00  - .00  -.01 
29 Appendix  Table  4 
Modeling Results  -- U.S.  Net Agricultural Trade  Changes 
Percentage  Change 
NTRADE%  US 
MacSharry-- --Nitrate Directive  Fertilizer Tax  ----
ST86-WD  SCEN  A  SCEN  B  SCEN  C  SCEN  D  SCEN  E  SCEN  F  SCEN  G  SCEN  H 
BF  -19.48  -60.53  -39.28  -79.01  .15  .20  .22  .28 
PK  85.19  100.37  -5.18  9.11  .56  .75  .80  1.03 
ML  14.80  10.50  7.00  2.95  .47  .63  .67  .87 
PM  -11.15  51.84  75.05  132.86  .59  .79  .84  1.08 
PE  -92.95  58.22  129.68  267.39  -1. 22  -1. 65  -1. 75  -2.27 
DM  .01  -.01  .01  - .01  -.01  .00  -.01  -.01 
DB  4.00  12.53  5.20  13.62  -.16  -.22  -.23  -.30 
DC  2.26  5.52  -5.63  -2.50  .07  .09  .10  .13 
DP  - .05  1.03  .09  1.15  -.01  -.02  - .02  - .02 
WH  2.74  3.42  1. 23  1. 93  .31  .41  .44  .57 
CN  8.32  9.61  4.60  5.94  .36  .49  .52  .68 
CG  31.09  36.61  18.68  24.39  2.79  3.76  4.00  5.17 
RI  .20  .28  .17  .26  .02  .03  .03  .04 
SB  .73  1. 21  .44  .93  .04  .06  .06  .08 
SM  5.32  2.19  -5.78  -8.70  .06  .09  .09  .12 
SO  - .06  -.79  -1.34  -2.02  -.05  -.07  - .08  -.10 
as  40.02  74.01  41.66  75.59  2.49  3.36  3.57  4.61 
OM  -81.12  -16.82  144.78  203.68  -1. 51  -2.03  -2.16  -2.79 
00  -.75  -.83  .22  .09  - .04  - .05  - .06  - . 07 
CT  -.20  -.31  -.07  -.19  -.00  -.00  -.00  -.01 
SU  .77  1.20  .82  1. 25  .06  .08  .08  .10 
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